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North Korea’s Strategic 
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Buffer Zone
From China’s strategic perspective, Taiwan and North Korea are intrin-
sically linked. 
China has claimed that its core national interests lie not just in economic 
development but also in national reunification.1 In terms of  economic rela-
tions, both China and the United States gain substantially from each other. 
In the security field, however, there is more competition and even rivalry 
between the two countries. This is especially pronounced with the issue of  
Taiwan – though the two countries are also cooperating to contain hardline 
pro-independence rhetoric. Beijing aspires to achieve reunification through 
peaceful means. However, certain U.S. actions, such as arms sales to Taiwan, 
can hardly be viewed as constructive on this issue and are inimical to China’s 
security.
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North Korea, also known as the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea 
(DPRK) serves as China’s strategic buffer zone in Northeast Asia. With a 
shared border of  1,400 kilometers, North Korea acts as a guard post for 
China, keeping at bay the tens of  thousands of  U.S. troops stationed in South 
Korea. This allows China to reduce its military deployment in Northeast 
China and focus more directly on the issue 
of  Taiwanese independence. To a certain 
extent, North Korea shares the security 
threat posed by U.S. military forces in South 
Korea and Japan.
At present, North Korea has acquired 
certain nuclear capabilities through testing 
that has greatly irritated the United States, 
though not yet to the point of  provoking it 
to use force. The United States has to main-
tain military pressure in the Korean Peninsula to prevent North Korea from 
taking pre-emptive action. However, the deterrent that North Korea’s devel-
opment of  nuclear weapons obtains could further restrict the U.S. military’s 
room to take action in the Korean Peninsula. The net effect of  this also helps 
to contain the freedom of  U.S. policy choices regarding Taiwan. Whether 
China needs it or not, this is North Korea’s “contribution” to China’s national 
security, and China is, therefore, unlikely to ignore its strategic value. 
Cooperation and assistance between China and North Korea is, at a mini-
mum, mutual. In fact, China merely provides North Korea with the means to 
survive, while North Korea acts as a bulwark against U.S. forces. How much 
has China spent on this arrangement? For approximately no more than a few 
billion dollars a year (as of  late), China has been provided with more than 50 
years of  peace.2 There is an argument that China has helped North Korea 
without getting anything in return.3 This statement is partially wrong. There 
is no altruism in international relations, including those between China and 
North Korea. By providing aid to North Korea, China is in essence helping 
itself. In this way, North Korea’s resistance to American interference on the 
question of  Taiwan and China’s aiding North Korea are intertwined. 
Conversely, North Korea may have its own view regarding this state of  
affairs. It may not be satisfied with the outcome of  the original Korean War  
– a divided Korea – despite the best efforts of  a Chinese Volunteer Force. 
North Korea reduces the 
military pressure China 
faces from the United 
States in the contingency 
of Taiwanese 
independence.
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The DPRK may still bear a grudge over conducting the war on its own soil. 
When China provides aid to North Korea some would view this as buying 
security insurance at a basement bargain price. One could even interpret the 
China-North Korea alliance as being more important to China than the U.S.-
Japan alliance is to the United States because the latter is largely asymmetrical 
in nature; that is, the security the United States has provided Japan was not 
equally reciprocated until roughly 10 years ago.4  
A Northeast Asian Libya?
The antagonism between North Korea and the United States creates a 
complicated strategic situation for China. A North Korea with nuclear 
weapons deters aggression on the one hand, but can also potentially trigger 
destabilizing events on the other. For China, any destabilizing action runs 
counter to its interests of  economic development. In addition, China needs 
to act in accordance with its role as a ‘responsible stakeholder’. In this regard, 
China will work with the United States and other states to the six-party talks to 
dissuade North Korea from nuclear brinkmanship. Meanwhile, the U.S. push 
to sell weapons to Taiwan directly harms mainland China’s national security. 
Even if  China would not ask for it, a nuclear North Korea’s ability to pin down 
U.S. forces in a Taiwan Strait contingency deters America’s consideration of  
possible military intervention. Whether one likes it or not, this is the link 
between North Korea and Taiwan. 
China must then ask itself: what kind 
of  security situation it will face if  one 
day North Korea signs a treaty with the 
United States, exchanges nuclear weapons 
for friendship, and, by doing so, follows in 
Libya’s footsteps? It is not a trivial ques-
tion. The question that is more fundamen-
tal than nuclear weapons development is 
what North Korea’s orientation will be. If  
China fails to handle the matter with deftness there is a real chance that North 
Korea will be cornered into provoking a war with the United States, a conflict 
that might eventually lead to North Korea’s defeat. The latter scenario would 
be disastrous for China. If  North Korea was defeated, the eventual outcome 
could lead to Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Taiwan (a part of  China) 
What kind of security 
situation will China face 
if one day North Korea 
signs a treaty with the 
United States, following 
in Libya’s footsteps?
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all aligning with the United States.  In that case, China’s security pressure 
regarding Taiwanese independence would be far more severe – a burden that 
would be hard to bear. 
Naturally, if  Taiwan does not declare independence and if  China can 
eventually achieve reunification, the aforementioned complications are greatly 
reduced. But this process won’t take place overnight. Therefore, the linkage 
between North Korea and Taiwan will remain, whether China needs it or 
not. The logical extension of  this, as some perceive it, is that following the 
resolution of  the Taiwan question, the possible strategic value that China held 
with North Korea and its nuclear arms would disappear. To an extent, this is 
reminiscent of  the United States’ dependence on China to counterbalance the 
Soviet Union, which ended after the Cold War. What such a scenario would 
mean for Chinese and Northeast Asian security is a more distant and complex 
issue and beyond the scope of  this paper.
North Korea’s Rationale
To understand the DPRK’s nuclear calculus it is necessary to look at the 
situation in other countries with nuclear weapons, beginning with the United 
States. The United States began its nuclear weapons program spurred on 
by the existential threat of  Nazi Germany’s own development of  an atomic 
bomb. Following the defeat of  Germany, however, the United States did not 
give up nuclear weapons because it perceived newly emerging threats. At the 
same time, the United States accrued many other benefits from possessing 
nuclear weapons, including influence on allies through providing them with a 
security umbrella, as well as establishing its position as a superpower and thus 
dominating world affairs.  
Since those early days, the United States has never relaxed its research on 
nuclear weapons. Currently, the American government is planning to conduct 
research on an enhanced “earth-penetrating nuclear warhead”, a new nuclear 
weapon that was included in the 2006 defense research budget.5 This weapon, 
along with the “miniaturized nuclear warhead”, which possesses an explosive 
force of  a few kilotons or less, typifies the concept of  “usable nuclear weap-
ons” that the Bush administration has tried to develop.6 
China has developed a limited nuclear weapons capability under the nuclear 
threat of  the United States. So, when can China eliminate its nuclear weapons? 
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If  someone were to call for the six-party talks to dismantle China’s nuclear 
weapons with a promise not to invade China, would Beijing act based on the 
good faith promised by others? Would China be willing to destroy or even 
reduce its nuclear weapons while the United States keeps its arsenal? The 
answer is obvious.
Currently, there are four main countries in the world that remain outside 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of  Nuclear Weapons (NPT). They are India, 
Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Among them, North Korea joined the NPT 
but withdrew from it in early 2003; the three other countries never joined. The 
fundamental reason these four countries refuse to give up a nuclear weapons 
option lies in their consideration of  national security. In addition, obtain-
ing nuclear weapons helps to boost national morale is good for raising the 
prestige of  the ruling party. This is also true for both the United States and 
the former Soviet Union. 
It is thought that North Korea was wielding the political card when it 
announced it had nuclear weapons. But North Korea is not just playing poli-
tics; rather, it is seeking a security guarantor. Because of  its distrust of  the 
United States, North Korea’s true aim is to possess nuclear weapons. If  even 
a superpower such as the United States, for the sake of  its own security, is 
not willing to give up nuclear weapons, how can one expect a weak country 
such as North Korea to do so? The greatest benefit nuclear weapons can 
offer a country is to deter a potential adversary from invading or threaten-
ing a nation’s core interests. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea’s aim in 
having nuclear weapons in the face of  external pressures is to protect their 
own national security. For them, possess-
ing nuclear weapons and the deterrence it 
provides always seems to be more reliable 
than giving up the development of  nuclear 
weapons and exchanging them for uncer-
tain or empty security assurances. 
In fact, a more meaningful question is 
whether a country that is much weaker than 
the United States and possesses such an 
arsenal to compensate for a deficiency in conventional force would give up its 
nuclear weapons even if  the United States took the lead in eliminating its own 
nuclear weapons. Again, the answer is self-evident. North Korea is developing 
Because of its distrust 
of the United States, 
North Korea’s true aim 
is to possess nuclear 
weapons.
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nuclear weapons in response to the U.S. threat against it, which has been exac-
erbated by the American invasion of  Iraq. Given the facts that in recent years 
the DPRK does not have an optimistic assessment of  the security situation in 
its surrounding region, and that the United States itself  is not willing to give 
up its own nuclear weapons, and that North Korea has invested 20 years or 
more into developing its nuclear program, 
why would North Korea give up its nuclear 
weapons in exchange for a guarantee of  no 
invasion, a basic commitment the United 
States is not even willing to provide?
The purpose of  the six-party talks was 
to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear 
ambitions. During the talks, North Korea 
did express its intention to give up nuclear 
weapons in exchange for other benefits.7 But in fact, it is unlikely that North 
Korea will ever give up its nuclear weapons. Judging by North Korea’s current 
mentality, this doesn’t seem to be the foremost among Pyongyang’s options. 
As for why it once took part in the talks; first, it had no other choice early on 
since it had not yet obtained nuclear weapons capability. Second, it may have 
held out hope for real dialogue with the United States. However, the bottom 
line remained that it would acquire nuclear weapons. It may have even used 
the six-party talks to buy time to develop its nuclear weapons.
The North Korean nuclear issue was mainly ignited by the United States, 
but China is able to play only a minor role to resolve this issue for several rea-
sons. First, China’s efforts to host the multilateral talks pressured North Korea 
to abandon nuclear weapons while at the same time undercuts Pyongyang’s 
chance to negotiate directly with Washington. As a result, North Korea may 
perceive China as unfriendly if  not a saboteur of  its core national interests.
Second, Beijing’s security relationship between China and North Korea 
is not one-sided. China provides security to North Korea, but North Korea 
also affords China with a measure of  security, and it is unlikely that China 
will risk it by pressuring North Korea too much. When the United States 
threatens other countries (just as it did China, prompting China to develop 
nuclear weapons), it seems unreasonable that it then demand other countries 
impose sanctions on the threatened country. Should any substantial sanctions 
be imposed, they should be done by the United States.  
North Korea’s bold 
move to develop nuclear 
weapons is also to 
make war on the Korean 
Peninsula more unlikely.
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Given that it is virtually impossible to fundamentally improve the North 
Korea-U.S. relations while President Bush is in office, North Korea can only 
concentrate on improving its nuclear weapon development at this time and 
postpone the goal of  rapprochement for a new administration. When North 
Korea regains acceptance in the international community, it is likely to open 
up economic cooperation with the rest of  the world. Therefore, nuclear tests 
end up being the key to opening North Korea’s development. 
In addition to considerations of  strengthening national security, the nuclear 
option helps alleviate the massive input of  resources required for conven-
tional weaponry and shift them to economic development. This is also the 
road that other nuclear weapons states such as the United States and China 
have taken. Though in the initial stages of  nuclear development a significant 
outlay is necessary, North Korea has made this investment and can now reap 
economic benefits of  its nuclear effort. 
North Korea’s bold move to develop nuclear weapons also makes war on 
the Korean Peninsula more unlikely. Given nuclear weapons capability, the 
possibility that war will break out on the Peninsula is slim because of  a num-
ber of  deterrent factors. The United States has 90,000 servicemen stationed 
in East Asia and the Pacific Region, with more than 30,000 of  them in South 
Korea. This puts the U.S. Army in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis North 
Korea, which maintains one of  the largest active military forces in the world, 
including a regular army of  1 million and up to 6 million reserves.8 As for 
conventional weaponry, North Korea has sufficient artillery and short-range 
missiles to cause massive casualties to the U.S. forces in South Korea. This ar-
senal might also constitute a significant deterrent to South Korea. But nuclear 
weapons constitute an additional deterrent, aimed at making the United States 
take North Korea more seriously. If  the United States takes pre-emptive ac-
tion it cannot ensure success without heavy cost. On the contrary, it would 
sink into another quagmire of  a messy war. The balance of  troops between 
North Korea and the United States as well as the destructive force of  nuclear 
weapons simply makes it hard for the United States to take military action 
against North Korea. 
Boundaries of  Sino-DPRK Relations
There is also an important factor related to the Sino-DPRK dynamic in 
North Korea’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. China is now much bet-
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ter off  since its opening up, yet North Korea barely survives. China appears 
uninterested in sustaining Article II of  its Treaty with North Korea signed in 
1961, which assures mutual military assistance in the case of  aggression by a 
third party against either one of  them.9 The United States has a security alliance 
with Japan and a Taiwan Relations Act concerning Taiwan, providing sufficient 
security guarantees to both. Comparing the U.S. security arrangement with 
its partners in East Asia, what China has 
provided to North Korea lately is far less 
in terms of  a military commitment. In light 
of  the current environment, it is likely that 
the DPRK won’t feel very secure under this 
treaty relationship with China.
North Korea may judge China to be in 
a state of  indecision regarding its priorities. 
On the one hand, the nuclear testing by the 
DPRK could give rise to serious consider-
ations of  regional nuclear proliferation and 
regional tensions and instability. However, 
North Korea may have concluded that China is more concerned about pre-
venting a regime change in North Korea, thus ensuring the stability of  the 
Korean Peninsula, and less concerned about non-proliferation. As a result, 
China may be forced to accept North Korea’s nuclear test. In addition, North 
Korea may calculate that not every country is willing to follow the United 
States. At the United Nations Security Council, although China and Russia 
have expressed dissatisfaction with the nuclear testing, substantive and com-
prehensive sanctions against North Korea simply do not accord with their 
fundamental interests and are definitely not a policy option for them or for 
other countries.10 To demonstrate that they are responsible powers, China and 
Russia have agreed to limited sanctions but have not accepted comprehensive 
sanctions, let alone cutthroat economic measures against North Korea.
China and North Korea used to carry the responsibility of  a “blood-bound 
alliance.” This allied cooperation seems to have greatly dissipated, though not 
abolished under international law. An attack launched by North Korea on 
South Korea or the United States, regardless of  whether North Korea has 
nuclear weapons, would not fall within the scope of  mutual assistance required 
under the China-North Korea Treaty. But if  North Korea comes under a pre-
Comparing the U.S. 
security arrangement 
with its partners in East 
Asia, what China has 
provided to North Korea 
lately is far less in terms 
of a military commitment. 
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emptive strike by the United States as a result of  having developed nuclear 
weapons, China would then be obligated to assist its partner, as interpreted by 
the terms of  that bilateral Treaty, if  it is still effective. Otherwise, China would 
lose the trust of  North Korea and the world and, therefore, would seriously 
harm its international credibility. 
In all of  this, North Korea has greater vested interests than China does. 
This fact made it extremely difficult for China to stop North Korea’s first 
nuclear test, just as it failed to prevent North Korea from conducting mis-
sile tests in August, 2006. Whether or not the DPRK conducts nuclear tests 
is ultimately Pyongyang’s decision, not China’s. What’s more, North Korea 
still has strategic value to Beijing given the potential headache of  Taiwanese 
independence, and therefore a “regime change” in North Korea looks unac-
ceptable to China. Even though North Korea has conducted a nuclear test it 
is still a security partner – albeit a difficult one – of  China. China needs North 
Korea, and North Korea understands this. 
In the short term, a North Korea with nuclear weapons would not pose a 
direct threat to China because China has not threatened North Korea. Rather, 
the problem is the responses that North Korea elicits from Japan and South 
Korea. Yet it is reasonable to ask what the long-term impact of  a nuclear 
weapons-capable North Korea will have on China and the region. The pos-
sibility that China’s future relations with North Korea or a reunified Korea 
would include the element of  nuclear weapon diplomacy cannot be excluded, 
especially given the border dispute between the two countries. North Korea 
is developing nuclear weapons based on a threat by the United States, but the 
weapons can be used for other purposes, as well. If  China is one day perceived 
as a threat, the DPRK’s nuclear arms could vastly complicate China’s handling 
of  its relations with the North. In the final analysis, China needs to maintain 
normal and friendly relations with North Korea. 
Managing a Nuclear North Korea
United States
By testing nuclear weapons, North Korea is bound to meet resolute op-
position from the United States because it has now breached one of  the two 
“red lines” set by the United States regarding the nuclear issue on the Korean 
Peninsula – nuclear testing and the exportation of  nuclear weapons or nuclear 
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weapons technology. However, the United States has no effective means to 
punish the DPRK for having tested a nuclear weapons device. The United 
States currently doesn’t seem to have the political option of  taking military 
action against North Korea,11 nor does it have substantive economic ties with 
North Korea, precluding a viable course of  action through direct economic 
sanctions.12  The United States can, at most, request of  its allies and UN mem-
ber states that have economic relations with the DPRK to use their leverage. 
In reality then, the United States now has only one remaining bottom line: 
that North Korea does not proliferate nuclear weapons, and in essence, that 
it becomes a responsible de facto nuclear country – a requirement the United 
States has of  China, India and Pakistan.
In fact, issues regarding the proliferation of  nuclear weapons are themselves 
controversial. Historically, nuclear weapons research began in Nazi Germany 
and the atom bomb was first acquired by the United States. Today eight 
countries have declared they have nuclear weapons. From one perspective, a 
consequence of  this has been a decrease in the danger of  large-scale war, so to 
a certain extent, nuclear weapons have stabilized relations between major pow-
ers, such as between China and the United States. The real concerns regarding 
the spread of  nuclear weapons are accidental and unauthorized launch, as well 
as such weapons falling into the hands of  irresponsible actors.
As for Northeast Asia, China considers its possession of  nuclear weapons 
as increasing the stability and security of  the region, rather than destroying 
the peace. China doesn’t intend to threaten other countries with its nuclear 
weapons, yet its nuclear weapons have 
served to deter aggression by the United 
States to some extent. The question fol-
lows, then, whether it is logical that China’s 
nuclear weapons are stabilizing while 
nuclear weapons of  other states may be 
destabilizing. Clearly, this assumption is 
not necessarily correct. The truth is that no 
nation should threaten another in the first 
place, but when coercion has occurred, the 
logic of  proliferation will ensue, and given 
certain international dynamics, the one that initiates the threat has to accept 
the reality of  proliferation. This is what happened when the United States 
The United States 
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threatened China and eventually had to accept China’s response of  develop-
ing its own atomic bomb. Most Chinese believe that without China’s nuclear 
weapons, the United States would take China less seriously.
Under the reality of  international politics, once China, India and Pakistan 
acquired nuclear weapons as a result of  their respective security concerns, 
the world became pragmatic about the situation. They are certainly expected 
to be responsible by working to assure 
the safety and security systems of  the 
weapons and not to transfer either the 
weapons or related knowledge and capa-
bilities outside their borders. For example, 
the United States has long complained of  
China’s record regarding nuclear and mis-
sile exports to Pakistan. Yet, through great 
effort, China has built up a legal system of  
export control in cooperation with other countries.13 As a result, today China 
is credited with handling such affairs with far more caution and experience.
Regarding North Korea, it is reasonable to ask whether the country will 
be a responsible actor in handling nuclear technology. Indeed the DPRK 
has shipped missiles to Yemen and possibly other countries.14 Would North 
Korea proliferate nuclear weapons? The possibility certainly exists, but one 
cannot conclude that the DPRK will proliferate because it is under a repres-
sive political system. When China obtained nuclear weapons in the 1960s its 
government was also regarded by Western countries as a dictatorship. Yet, 
China did not threaten to sell them or use them, except as a deterrent force 
for ensuring national security.
Without a chance to improve relations with the United States, which is 
viewed by Pyongyang as threatening its national security, North Korea will 
continue to develop its nuclear force. With its uranium mines, North Korea 
can be self-sufficient in building a closed fuel-cycle for a nuclear arsenal. While 
it may not yet have a sufficient nuclear deterrent, as few as 10-20 nuclear war-
heads would surely force the United States to accept it and deal with North 
Korea as a de facto nuclear nation.
As long as North Korea becomes and remains a responsible nuclear nation, 
i.e., it does not threaten other countries with nuclear weapons or participate in 
their proliferation, aid or abet terrorists, engage in money laundering or drug 
Without a chance to 
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trafficking then it is bound to achieve normal relations with the United States. 
North Korea could expect that after it has made sufficient breakthroughs 
in nuclear weapons development and after withstanding international pres-
sure for a certain period of  time, it will eventually return to the international 
community. 
This opportunity will not likely come until the term of  the next U.S. presi-
dent. On the whole, before North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, the core 
of  its conflict with the United States lay in their development. But now that it 
has obtained them, its nuclear weapons capability will become the bargaining 
chip to obtain strategic status from the United States, as well as the key to at-
taining strategic understanding from the United States. By then, proliferation 
to other countries will become the core issue in DPRK-U.S. relations.
China and Northeast Asia
While accepting sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear test, concerned 
countries in Northeast Asia must be careful not to push North Korea into a 
corner, forcing it to take pre-emptive action. Therefore, room for compro-
mise needs to be preserved so that North Korea is prompted to exercise self-
restraint and not continue its nuclear testing.15 However, this is still a retreat 
from the six-party talks, which required North Korea to give up its pursuit of  
nuclear weapons. Even if  North Korea makes a tactical retreat, it probably 
would not halt the overall development of  its nuclear weapons program. On 
the contrary, it could regard the international community as having accepted 
its position as a new nuclear power. These are the contradictions that must 
be faced.
As for China, even if  it did impose economic sanctions, the total of  its 
affected aid would not be more than few billion U.S. dollars.16 This is actually 
a small amount for North Korea’s population of  23 million and will not be 
sufficient to fundamentally alter its economic situation. There are also lessons 
from China’s own past that it would do well to remember. For instance, when 
the Soviet Union withdrew its aid following the Sino-Soviet ideological split, 
not only did China virtually disregard all of  the past assistance provided by the 
Soviet Union, but it also bore a grudge for a long time afterward.17 In similar 
fashion, China has not expressed much appreciation for the aid provided by 
Japan during the past two decades, but has rather showed great contempt for 
Japan when it threatened to dramatically reduce that aid. Therefore, if  China 
Shen Dingli
31China Security  Autumn  2006
discontinues aid to North Korea, the reaction by the DPRK will likely be the 
same.
North Korea has issued a statement guaranteeing that it will be a respon-
sible nuclear country and that it will not strike first with nuclear weapons or 
proliferate them.18 If  this is true, their possession by North Korea should 
be less of  a stimulus for Japan or South Korea to develop nuclear weapons. 
Nevertheless, it will certainly affect the 
alliances between the United States and 
Japan as well as between the United States 
and South Korea. 
In the face of  North Korea’s nuclear 
test, Japan and South Korea have two 
options: develop their own nuclear weap-
ons or strengthen their alliances with the 
United States without developing their 
own nuclear weapons. They are more 
likely to choose the latter option, relying to a greater degree on the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella and missile defense system rather than developing their own 
nuclear weapons, a move that would provoke the United States itself  and 
many other countries. In Japan, there has been some debate on the future 
of  its nuclear path with some officials suggesting a review of  the country’s 
three “no” principles on nuclear weapons.19 But these have been suppressed 
by the United States’ reaffirmation of  extended deterrence. For South Korea, 
the course of  “localizing” and limiting its forces in the joint combat system 
with the United States could slow down or even be reversed if  the situation 
deteriorates. Whatever the strategic decisions by Japan and South Korea in 
response to North Korean nuclear tests, China will have little influence over 
them.
On the other hand, bilateral relations between China and South Korea are 
deepening because of  the North Korea issue. Both are opposed to North 
Korea’s military nuclear program and would opt for a peaceful settlement. 
This is a major positive force within the six-party talks.
Farther afield, North Korea’s nuclear tests will undoubtedly encourage 
Iran. The DPRK nuclear model – resisting pressure and gaining recognition 
– could embolden Tehran. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the 
United States is mired in Iraq and Afghanistan and will not attack Iran or 
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North Korea anytime soon. Withdrawing now will cause Iraq to become the 
world’s most dangerous breeding ground for terrorism. If  a decision is made 
to attack Iran, it would be the quickest way to undermine the United States as 
a first-class superpower.
The war on terror has in effect lowered China’s place on America’s list 
of  perceived threats. This has served as an opportunity for China’s peace-
ful development as the United States must show goodwill toward Beijing on 
the issue of  Taiwan. To successfully pursue its development goals, China has 
persisted in commanding a stable and smooth course without making any 
mistakes. In the meantime, the United States has made major mistakes as of  
late, many of  which will be difficult to reverse. Launching a strike against Iran 
or North Korea would be one more blunder that will push the United States 
further into decline.
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